

From the Greater Beijing to Jing-Jin-Ji: a new Northern Chinese megalopolis

ANNA IRENE DEL MONACO¹

Abstract: Jing-Jin-Ji indicates the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region relaunched by the Chinese Communist Party Secretary in July 2014 as a model of development that assumes the redistribution of economic and industrial resources. On closer inspection, however, is part of a long-term national program, as it is documented by several researches and reports, within an historical geographical territorial pattern and of the overall strategy forecasting the almost total migration from the countryside to the city (rural-urban migration) for 70% of the population, to increase the level of urbanization. And it is also part of a plurimillenary urban re-foundation.

Keywords: Beijing, Tianjing, Hebei, Jing-Jin-Ji, Greater Beijing, urban villages.

BeiJing-TianJin-HebeiJi

Jing-Jin-Ji² is the name used by politicians and journalists to indicate the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region, which, with a population of about 130 million, includes the municipal territory of the Capital City of Beijing, the city of Tianjing and Hebei Province.

The *Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Coordinated Development Program*,³ strongly supported by Xi Jinping and the third program of its kind (after the Pearl River Delta and the Blue River Delta), is a response to some of the major urban planning problems in the north – and at the same time, it is a model of development that assumes the redistribution of economic and industrial resources. Relaunched by the Chinese Communist Party Secretary in July 2014, the plan has reactivated the recent interest of some geopolitical observatories such as Limes⁴ – a monthly Italian geopolitical magazine – which presented in a Jing-Jin-

1. Anna Irene Del Monaco: Assistant Professor of Architecture and Urban Design, Sapienza University of Rome; email: anna.delmonaco@uniroma1.it.

2. Considering the names of the administrations in Mandarin: «Jing» means Beijing; «Jin» stands for Tianjin and «Ji» is an abbreviation of Hebei.

3. ISPI 2014.

4. CUSCITO 2016.

Ji article as “Xi Jinping’s urban legacy”. Or the Internazionale – an Italian weekly magazine – that published an article entitled *In China begins the construction of a larger city of South Korea*⁵ emphasizing the value of investments on high-speed rail networks worth \$ 36 million. In 2014, just a few months before the beginning of Xi’s presidential term, Guido Santevecchi, a correspondent from Beijing of Corriere della Sera, presented Jing-Jin-Ji as «the 110 million inhabitants megalopolis that impresses the world... Xi Jinping’s idea to renew the splendor of the Great Wall»⁶ highlighting the identification between the presidency of Xi and the implementation of the new northern megalopolis. And recalling, by symmetry, the fact that Deng Xiaoping, during his presidency, established the special economic zone of Shenzhen, in 1978, and Jiang Zemin pushed the industrialization of the Yangtze Delta in the early 1990s, designating Shanghai as the financial center of China.

On closer inspection, Jing-Jin-Ji’s northern megalopolis has been under implementation for several decades and, certainly, during Xi’s presidency, the program will reach an advanced level of implementation. As recent studies documenting the social, economic, political history of China over the last fifty years, such as *China’s Urban Transition*⁷ by John Friedman, or the book by Ignazio Musu *La Cina contemporanea*,⁸ the goal of the Seventh Five-Year Plan, is documented (1986-90), summarized by the Ladder-step doctrine slogan, had defined the objectives of regional development in coastal regions and the concentration of energy production and raw materials in the inner central regions. The development of Jing-Jin-Ji, therefore, is part of a long-term national program and is not just a goal recently emerged among the lines of Xi Jinping’s political program: this is confirmed by studies and documents. In particular, we mention the report by Zhai Baohui, Jia Yuliang, Xu Qingyun presented at the Coordination development in the capital region of China 40th ISoCaRP Congress in 2004 with the title *A long Way to Go: in the capital Region of China?*⁹ in which the cartographic documentation presented and the programmatic objectives

5. REUTERS 2016.

6. SANTEVECCHI 2014.

7. FRIEDMAN 2011.

8. MUSU 2011.

9. ZHAI, JIA, XU 2004

discussed reconstruct the essential chronological phases of the policies related to it. The long-term nature of the program, among other things, is confirmed by the ten-year studies of the multidisciplinary research group led by Wu Liangyong, published in various volumes¹⁰ and update phases, coordinated by the Institute of Architecture and Urban Studies of the Tsinghua University of Beijing founded and led by Wu himself. Also Zhai Baohui, Jia Yuliang, Xu Qingyun write that the first studies on the hypothesis of Greater Beijing Region (GBR), held by the research group of Wu Liangyong, initially scarcely considered by the central administration, go back to the early years' 80. One of the first cartographic schemes, in fact, is in 1984 (Fig.1) bears the following caption: «The Jing-Jin-Tang area when SPC (State Planning Committee) and SCC (State Construction Committee) initiated the regional planning scheme in 1982 [Sources: Scheme of regional planning of the Jing-Jin-Tang area, Beijing: China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (1984)]».

Continuing to investigate the past administrative structure of the Hebei province, we find that Hudson Lockett¹¹, financial reporter, provides an interesting note: «the history of JingJinJi hearkens back to the Ming and Qing Dynasties, under which Beijing, Tisnjing and hebei were known as a single province (“Zhili”, meaning “directly ruled” by the imperial state) having roughly analogous borders. But in 1928 the Republic of China designated Beijing and Tianjing as spacial municipalities, with most of the surrounding territory reconstituted into the province of Hebei». However, there are positions that highlight the critical aspects of the program, such as that of Pan Jianhua, director of the Institute for Urban and Environmental Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and member of the China's National Expert Panel on Climate Change: «The Jing-Jin Strategy had been conceived to transfer some activities outside the capital, but in the end it is becoming Beijing-centric, placing other cities in a subordinate position, a great imbalance in access to education and health».¹²

10. WU 1986; WU 1999; WU, DENG 2000.

11. LOCKETT 2016.

12. LIU 2015.

Returning to the *Ladder-step doctrine* it is possible to observe that Chongqing – still today the only large megalopolis located in the inland regions together with Chengdu – was expected as the fourth development pole to be upgraded, once the coastal development started. This intention can be read from the objectives of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) and was implemented through the project known as *Three Gorges Dam*, a dam that reactivated the navigation of the Yangtze River up to Chongqing, favoring the development of the area.

The program, therefore, generally provided for the division of China into three geographical areas corresponding to the major coastal cities identified as “core regions” and clearly highlighted by the 2002 scheme drawn up by the Wu research team (Fig. 2).¹³ In less than fifteen years, implementing the umpteenth “refoundation” urban, the program and the forecasts of Chinese scholars and then the central administration on the development of Jing-Jin-Ji have occurred and implemented (Fig. 3). Moreover, Jing-Jin-Ji is an emerging megalopolis compared to the conurbations developed around the coastal megalopolis of the south of the country, already consolidated for decades along the main geographic water systems – that is the Pearl River Delta (Zhu Jiang Delta) and the Yellow River (Huang He), with China having a network of historical waterways of about 125,000 km (Fig. 4). Jing-Jin-Ji, in fact, collects a population comparable to that of not far away Tokyo (about 127 million inhabitants), attracted by favorable conditions and resources: Beijing is home to political power, major hospitals, historic university campuses and newly established innovative research centers in joint ventures with Western institutions; Tianjin is a port city and a logistics port; Hebei is a region of a naturalistic nature with a high environmental quality and a good level of manufacturing production and is considered an optimal location to develop logistic bases, industrial pilot areas and “a demonstration area for urbanization and urban-rural development”.¹⁴

The program of the Chinese government, which intends to implement the almost total migration from the countryside to the city (rural-urban migration) for 70% of the population, aims to increase the level of urbanization, which is essential for moving from an economy

13. FRIEDMAN 2011, p. 23.

14. CHINA DAILY 2014.

dependent on exports to one based on internal consumption and services. This program implements a change deemed necessary to achieve the so-called “moderate prosperity” envisaged in the first Xi Jinping program, characterized by a lower GDP growth rate than in previous years (it should range between 6.5 and 7%)¹⁵ and greater attention to the pursuit of a higher quality of life. Thus, in broad terms, the objectives of the Thirteenth-Year Plan (2016-2020), set on objectives (focus area) that recall the following globally shared principles “innovation, balancing, greening, opening up, sharing”, to be implemented through *policies* set on the specific Chinese social and economic condition: «Everyone is an entrepreneur, creativity of the masses, Made in China 2025, Economy needs a Rule of Law, Urbanization with Chinese characteristics, National defense reform, Two-child policy».

In addition to the studies of the World Bank on these more general issues, we mention some articles by Ian Johnson appeared in *The New York Times*, in particular *China Plans Vast Urbanization of 2013*.¹⁶ Moreover, some relevant issues, framed in a historical perspective, are discussed in the summary collected in the contribution of Lucio Valerio Barbera and Anna Irene Del Monaco entitled *A Rural-Urban Metamorphosis in China: The Real Great Leap Forward?*¹⁷

Continuous foundation

The urban situation of Jing-Jin-Ji is now essential if one intends to study the plurimillenary foundation/re-foundation process of the city of Beijing and its wider territory, a process with a reiterative character in the history of Chinese urban culture. The story of the foundation and refoundation of Beijing – which has not always been the imperial capital of China –, among other things, is very articulate, sometimes tormented during the various dynasties, as evidenced by significant studies on the subject: G. William Skinner, *The city in Late Imperial China*, Stanford University Press, 1977;¹⁸ Wu Liangyong, *A brief history*

15. CUSCITO, cit.

16. JOHNSON 2013.

17. BARBERA, DEL MONACO 2014.

18. SKINNER 1977.




Fig.1. The Jing-Jin-Tang area when SPC (State Planning Committee) and SCC (State Construction Committee) initiated the regional planning scheme in 1982 [Sources: Scheme of regional planning of the Jing-Jin-Tang area, Beijing: China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (1984)]. [Source: Zhai Baohui, Jia Yuliang, Xu Qingyun. Coordinative development in the capital region China 40th ISOcARP Congress 2004].




Fig.2. Tinghai WU, Chengguo ZHANG, Post-Reform New Town Development in China, China City Planning Review Vol. 22, No. 4, 2013, P. 57: New towns in Beijing's Metropolitan Region (left); China's new town and land use system (right).



Fig. 3. The location of cities in CRC: Development of three urban regions, presentation on the City Development Forum over Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau of China, Wu Lingyong (2002). [Source: Zhai Baohui, Jia Yuliang, Xu Qingyun. Coordinative development in the capital region China 40th ISoCaRP Congress 2004].



Fig. 4. Three urban regions in China. Source: Development of three urban regions, presentation on the City Development Forum over Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau of China; Wu Liangyong (2002).

of ancient Chinese city planning,¹⁹ Wu Liangyong, *Rehabilitating the old city of Beijing. A project in the Ju er Hutong neighborhood*,²⁰ Wang Yi, *A Century of Change: Beijing's Urban Structure in the 20th Century*,²¹ Nancy Shatzman Steinhardt, *Chinese Imperial City Planning*, University of Hawaii Press, 1999; Jun Wang, *Beijing Record. A Physical and Political History of Planning Modern Beijing*.²²

Among other things, it must be said that unlike the cases of the European and Italian foundation cities, in the case of the Chinese megalopolis, and in particular of Beijing, after the destruction of its urban walls in 1949 and later of most of the courtyard houses fabric (*siheyuan*), the concept of the “foundation” of the city no longer has a close correlation with the morphological and typological theme. Before 1949, infact, Beijing was a city of about two-three million inhabitants organized in a wonderful urban plan composed of single-family urban houses. Then between the 40s-70s frequent building substitutions with modern buildings of 7-8 floors strongly inspired by low-cost modern Soviet residential units occurred. Since the late 1980s, despite the dense debate between politicians, entrepreneurs and academics, the high-rise model prevailed to implement the new massive expansions.²³

The most recent international literature on transition policies from the controlled industrial economy to the socialist market economy tends to highlight the exceptional speed of recent Chinese urban development, a consequence of the opening policies initiated in the 1978 by President Deng Xiaoping, without providing sufficient arguments explaining possible factors of continuity with the history and geography of the country. But if one compares the current condition of the territories of contemporary China with the descriptions and maps present in the writings of scholars, diplomats, geographers such as Skinner (1977), Mote (1977), Martino Martini (1658), Botero (1588), they identify many aspects still useful for today's reasoning. Giovanni Botero, based on the descriptions of Marco Polo, describes China in 1558 as a country in which the physical organization of territory and

19. WU 1986.

20. WU 1999.

21. WANG 2016.

22. WANG 2003.

23. ABRAMSON 1997.

power substantially coincide, a compact and unitary country, unlike the Italian urban tradition at the time when Botero writes: «China was not an agglomeration of semiautonomous city-states, and that it was not a country in which island-cities were surrounded by rude peasants. That all of China, as it were, constituted one organizational entity as though it were ‘one city’». ²⁴ Even if the scale of Jing-Jin-Ji is profoundly more extensive than that of Beijing mentioned by Botero, the narrative utopia that supports the recent political propaganda tends to present the Greater Beijing Region, in fact synonymous with Jing-Jin-Ji, as a “double core” Beijing-Tianjin in a single system “one system” – as it is evident in Wu Liangyong and Tsinghua University’s latest studies.

In an article published on June 8, 2016 on The Guardian, titled *China’s memory manipulators*, Ian Johnson, an award-winning journalist known for several books on Chinese modernization, traces a dense reconstruction of the relationship with the idea of history and memory that the government The People’s Republic of China has pursued since its foundation, schematizing the paragraphs with the following titles: “history suppressed, history recreated, history recovered”. When Johnson writing comes to more recent times, he affirms that the new urban settlements are built in places whose past is “obliterated”, so much so that the names of the places do not correspond to the actual characters of the same, because they describe urban elements or landscapes of the past and that no longer exist physically. After 1989 and the Tiananmen massacre, the Communist Party urged the defense of culture and traditions, in particular of what UNESCO would call “intangible cultural heritage”. Ian Johnson continues to deepen Xi’s approach: «since taking power in November 2012, Xi Jinping cloaked himself in the mantle of tradition more than any Chinese leader since the imperial system collapsed in 1911. Building on the work of his predecessors, especially Hu Jintao and his call for a Taoist-sounding “harmonious society” (Hexie shehui), Xi’s ideological program includes an explicit embrace of traditional ethical and religious imagery». ²⁵

24. MOTE 1977, p. 269.

25. JOHNSON 2016.

Between collective memory and a new vision of the countryside

In the Chinese urban tradition the idea of founding or refounding cities corresponds to a very important ritual, as much as in other important urban civilizations. It includes the way some topical places are designed and conceived, often located in a wider geographical context than the one close to the imperial palace, on a scale that can be described and interpreted with the conceptual tools of the landscape, that is, the main scale of the traditional Chinese various interventions, as taught by Lucio Barbera,²⁶ reading historical buildings such as the Forbidden City, the Ming Tomb system, the Summer Palace.

The action of manipulation/reconstruction of memory indicated by Ian Johnson in his long essay brings to mind the beautiful essay by Maurizio Bettini, *It is worth studying the myths?*²⁷ in the framework of ancient Roman history. The author dedicates great importance to the distinction that Tito Livio proposes between the concept of *fabula* and *history*, the first unreliable one the second guarantee of the narration of the past with his *incorrupta monumenta* in his very famous *Dalla Fondazione di Roma (Ab urbe Condita)* [Since Rome foundation]. The author also recalls the teaching of Maurice Halbwachs²⁸ on collective memory: «it would be naive to believe that “translation” is also a synonym of antiquity, genuineness or authenticity, that the traditions of a community, and with it its myths, they may be ‘reconstructed’ from time to time depending on the needs of the present, it is a fact well known for the necessity of insisting on it. This is a phenomenon linked to the way in which the collective memory of a community proceeds in general. As Maurice Halbwachs once taught us, in fact, the collective memory is based on a series of frames of reference – frames of a social nature – that strongly influence their contents. To change in these social frameworks, the “memories” also change that you have of the past».

Beijing's urban history is among the most significant, if one intends to investigate the idea of a foundation as an ideologically programmed

26. BARBERA 2006.

27. BETTINI 2010.

28. HALBWACHS 1952. It is Halbwachs' merit to have strongly emphasized this intrinsic character of the functioning of collective memory, in a dimension that can be defined as “socioconstructivist”; cfr. J. Assmann, Cultural memory, Scripture, memory and political identity in the degrees of ancient civilizations, op. cit.

urban fact. This character can be found in almost all the Chinese imperial capitals to which Hangzhou,²⁹ the imperial city during the Middle Song dynasty, is an exception, and whose plan was adapted to the scheme required by imperial urban rites, when around 1280, with the advance of the Mongols to the south, the capital was moved from Kaifeng to Hangzhou. In fact, the Chinese capitals were planned according to a very precise scheme described in the Zhou's Book of Rite: «The Capital City represents the power of the state called the so-called supremacy of the four quarters. in one aspect the political, economic and cultural achievements of Chinese society and city development.³⁰ [...] The Ideals of City Planning Stated in “Kao Gong Ji” in “Zhou's Book of Rites»... (“The Artificer's Record”) (Fig. 5) is generally recognized as a work in the early period of the Warring States (481/403 BCE - 221 BCE).

Following the interpretative trace of Andrea Carandini exposed in the introduction to this volume, if the Chinese imperial capitals are almost all foundation cities they would not be real cities, being their spatial plan set up following precise administrative and ceremonial rules: «Any real city is designed for the most spontaneously even when orderly, in which we are not in a foundation city».

As Beijing's urban history shows up to 1949, the city has maintained on average two million inhabitants, ranging from one million to four million – with the exception of periods of famine and wars. The 1954 Beijing Master Plan documents the construction of thirty-five new industrial areas, between 1953 and 1957, including the industrial and textile centers-east along the Tonghui River and the industrial and manufacturing areas for electronics located north-east (Jiuxianqiao).³¹ From the mid-fifties until the mid-eighties, as Liu Jian explains in her essay *Transformation of Industrial Layout in the Spatial Planning of Beijing*, Beijing's urban structure remained substantially stable with respect to its national policy role which destined the city for the role of political, economic, cultural, scientific and industrial center. Following these directives, many residential areas were built around production areas according to the proximity principle, so were born the

29. DAI, DEL MONACO, YU 2015-17.

30. FLETCHER, PEISERT 1986, p. 3.

31. LIU 2015.

work units (*danwei communities*), both in social and spatial terms. This kind of organizational structure of work and life has conditioned the urban character of Beijing for decades, with a partial variation, explains Liu Jian – pupil of Wu Liangyong –, in 1958, with the beginning of the Great Leap Forward, that is the social economic plan undertaken by the People's Republic of China to modernize the country based on the model of a communist and collectivist society. This condition led to a greater integration between the industrial and rural areas in the suburbs of Beijing and some changes in the functional scheme previously based on zoning and replaced by a scheme in which manufacturing, industrial and agricultural production activities were integrated and often separated from the fabric inhabited by large green areas. In his 1989 book *A General Theory of Architecture*, Wu Liangyong writes: «To what extent has been contributed to regional economic development or as socialist geographers to “the transformation of nature” for the benefit of mankind? Before 1977 Chinese research in physical geography, following the Soviet tradition, almost totally ignored the role of an agent of environmental change». Since the early '50s Wu Liangyong, a young assistant of Liang Sicheng, represents, together with his research group, the main scientific expert for the Chinese Government on the planning of Beijing, as evidenced by his studies, publications, assignments of official planning.

After the entry of China in the World Trade Organization in 2008 and the drafting of the Master Plan Olympics Green Beijing 2008, a further exercise of re-foundation-reaffirmation of the North-South axis on which the capital city has been set for centuries, has been screened from Tsinghua University planning experts and intersects the addresses of the City Master Plan of Beijing (1991-2010) promoting a general urban restructuring program. The Olympic facilities of 2008 will be reused for the Winter Olympics 2022. The New City Master Plan 2004-2020, writes Liu Jian: «reconfirmed the orientation of Beijing's industrial development to modern service industries, new and high-tech industries, and modern manufacturing industries, which are all characterized by high technical content, low resource consumption, and low environmental impact, which focus on the quality and benefits of industrial development. The expansion of the main urban centers

has often met existing residential and productive areas stimulating the foundation of “post-reform new towns”, settlements that, as Tinghai Wu, Chengguo Zhang explain, «are very different from the Western “new town” and present “with Chinese characteristics”: the Chinese version of the new urban scale emerged (sub-) urban residential and consumption spaces».³²

A consequence of the urban restructuring undertaken in the last twenty years is the problem of the rehabilitation, of the redevelopment and the reintegration of the old settlements of the working units (work units-*dawei*) – often reused to pave creative industries – and of the villages in the city (urban villages or villages in the city), the villages of agricultural communes – some of these become Taobao villages, i.e. rural villages inhabited by migrants or ethnic minorities in which, as part of a strategy of repopulation and rural redevelopment promoted by Alibaba Group, a very powerful e-commerce industry, promoted the location of e-commerce stores in very low-cost areas – in 2015 there were around 200,000 Taobao villages in all of China and grew by 268%. It will be a very interesting phenomenon to observe, in general, regarding the rethinking of urban villages (Fig. 5).

So the refoundation in China, as well as the physical dimension, now takes place also on a “digital” level and on the basis of new collective facilities: young architects like the Rural Framework (Rufwork), in fact, experiment by realizing quality public services in rural areas. Who knows if Jack Ma, CEO of Alibaba, sooner or later, does not finance a certain number such as to make evident the result of the experimentation of new forms of “work units” refounding the Chinese countryside in the era of globalization. The integration between the population of urban villages and that of the cities is far from simple to implement, the differences are many. And even the hypothesis of tourism in agricultural villages recently promoted by the Chinese government is not. Certainly the new digital technologies applied to urban facts – *urbanizing technology* would say Saskia Sassen – are changing the way of life to many of the billions of citizens.

32. WU, ZHANG 2013, p. 57.






Fig. 5. Graduation Thesis of Giorgio Capponi. Beijing | Hegezhuang Village | visiting student at Tsinghua University 2015-2016. Advisor: Anna Irene Del Monaco (Sapienza University of Rome) Co-Advisor: Liu Jian (Tsinghua University of Beijing).

Bibliography

ABRAMSON 1997

Daniel Abramson, *Neighborhood Redevelopment as a Cultural Problem. A Western Perspective on Current Plans for the Old City of Beijing*. Doctoral Dissertation, Tsinghua University of Beijing 1997.

BARBERA 2006

Lucio Barbera, *I linguaggi della Cina*, “L’industria delle costruzioni”, vol. 389; p. 4-11, 2006.

BARBERA, DEL MONACO 2014

Lucio Barbera, Anna Irene Del Monaco, *A Rural-Urban Metamorphosis in China: The Real Great Leap Forward?*, L’architettura delle Città. The Journal of the Scientific Society Ludovico Quaroni, L’ADC #3-4-5, 2014.

BETTINI 2010

Maurizio Bettini, Vale la pena di studiare i miti? In Maurizio Bettini, Maurizio Boldrini, Omar Calabrese e Gabriella Piccinni, *Miti di Città* Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Edité par Salvietti & Baruffi 2010.

CHINA DAILY 2014

China Daily, *Roles of Beijing, Tianjing, and Hebei in integrated development*, 2014, 04/04. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/04/content_17407089.htm

CUSCITO 2016

Giorgio Cuscito, *Jing-Jin-Ji. L’eredità urbana di Xi Jinping*, “Limes”, *Indagine sulle periferie*, n° 4, 2016.

DAI, DEL MONACO, YU 2015

Xiaoling Dai, Anna Irene Del Monaco, Wenbo Yu, *Hangzhou: from Song Dynasty Capital to the Challenge of Cultural Capital in Contemporary China*, L’ADC #2 UNESCO Series, Nuova Cultura 2015.

FRIEDMAN 2011

John Friedman, *China’s Urban Transition*, University of Minnesota Press 2011.

FLETCHER, PEISERT 1986

Roderick Fletcher, Christoph Peisert (edited by), *A Brief History of Ancient Chinese City Planning by Wu Liangyong*, *Urbs et Regio* Kassel 1986, p. 3.

HALBWACKS 1952

Maurice Halbwacks, *Le cadres sociaux de la memoire*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1952, p. 291. *La memoria collettiva*, trad. it, edited by P. Jedlowski, Postfazione di L. Passerini, Milano, Unicopoli 1987;

ISPI 2014, *Jing-Jin-Ji: la nuova megalopoli nel nord della Cina*, ISPI on-line, 1, Ottobre, 2014; <http://www.ispionline.it/it/focuscina/jing-jin-ji-la-nuova-megalopoli-nel-nord-della-cina-10945>

JOHNSON 2013

Ian Johnson, *China Plans Vast Urbanization*, “The New York Times, International Weekly”, June 24th 2013.

JOHNSON 2016

Ian Johnson, *China's memory manipulators*, “The Guardian”, 8 June 2016.

LIU 2015

Liu Jian, *Transformation of Industrial Layout in the Spatial Planning of Beijing*, in Matteo Bonino, Filippo De Pieri, *Beijing Danwei Industrial Heritage in the Contemporary City*, Jovis Verlag 2015.

LIU QIN 2015

Liu Qin, *Falsa partenza per Jing-Jin-Ji*, <http://www.cinaforum.net/metropoli-jing-jin-ji-543-perche-non-serve-la-mega-megalopoli/>

LOCKETT 2016

Hudson Lockett, *Together as One: Is JingJinJi all that it is touted to be?*, CKGSB (Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business) Knowledge January 20th 2016; <http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2016/01/20/china/together-as-one-is-jingjinji-all-that-it-is-touted-to-be/>

MOTE 1977

F.M. Mote, *The Transformation for Nanking*, in G. William Skinner, *The city in Late Imperial China*, Stanford University Press, 1977, p. 105. Quotation from Giovanni Botero, *The Greatness of Cities* (1588), p. 269.

MUSU 2011

Ignazio Musu, *La Cina contemporanea*, il Mulino 2011.

REUTERS 2106, *In Cina comincia la realizzazione di una città più grande della Corea del Sud*, “Internazionale”, dicembre 2016; <https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/2016/12/06/cina-citta-jing-jin-ji>

SANTEVECCHI 2014

Guido Santevecchi, *Cina, la megalopoli da 110 milioni di abitanti che impressiona il mondo*, Corriere della Sera, 28 giugno 2014.

SKINNER 1977.

G. William Skinner, *The city in Late Imperial China*, Stanford University Press 1977.

WANG 2003

Jun Wang, *Beijing Record. A Physical and Political History of Planning Modern Beijing*, SDX joint Publishing Company House, October 2003.

WANG 2016

Wang Yi, *A Century of Change: Beijing's Urban Structure in the 20th Century*, (The Urban Book Series) Springer 2016.

WU 1986

Wu Liangyong, *A brief history of ancient Chinese city planning*. Urbs et Regio, Sonderband 38, Gesamthochschulbibliothek 1986.

WU 1999

Wu Liangyong, *Rehabilitating the old city of Beijing. A project in the Ju er Hutong neighborhood*, UBC Press 1989.

WU, Deng 2000

Wu Liangyong, Deng Y., *Beijing 2049 Spatial Development Strategy*, Tsinghua University Press 2000.

WU, ZHANG 2013

Tinghai Wu, Chengguo Zhang, *Post-Reform New Town Development in China, Critical Insight*, "China City Planning Review", Vol. 22, No. 4, 2013, p. 57.

ZHAI, JIA, XU 2004

Zhai Baohui, Jia Yuliang, Xu Qingyun, *A long Way to Go: the coordinative Development in the capital Region of China?*, Coordinative development in the capital region China 40th ISoCaRP Congress 2004.